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ON DUALISTIC EQUILIBRIUM AND TECHNICAL 
CHANGE I N  A SIMPLE HUMAN SETTLEMENT MODEL 
John R .  M i r o n  
A p r i l  1 9 7 6  
Research Memoranda are interim reports on research being con- 
ducted by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
and as such receive only limited scientific review. Views or opin- 
ions contained herein do not necessarily represent those o f  the 
Institute or of  the National Member Organizations supporting the 
Institute. 
This  paper was o r i g i n a l l y  prepared under t h e  t i t l e  "Modelling 
f o r  Management" f o r  p r e s e n t a t i o n  a t  a  Nate r  Research Cent re  
(U.K. ) Conference on "River  P o l l u t i o n  Con t ro l " ,  Oxford, 
9 - 1 1  A s r i l ,  1979. 
T h i s  p a p e r  is  t h e  f o u r t h  i n  a s e r i e s  on 'Reg iona l  Development 
and Land-Use Models ' .  The purpose  of  t h i s  s e r i e s  i s  t o  c o n s i d e r  
tlie a p p l i c a t i o n  of  o p t i m i z i n g  and b e h a v i o u r a l  land-use  models as 
t o o l s  i n  t h e  s t u d y  of  r e g i o n a l  development .  The p r e s e n t  paper  
c o n s i d e r s  t h e  problem of  t h e  impact  of economic growth on r e g i o n a l  
l and-use  p a t t e r n s .  A t h e o r e t i c a l  model of a s i m p l e  s p a t i a l  econ- 
omy i s  developed.  The model c a n  be used t o  trace o u t  t h e  i m p l i -  
c a t i o n s  of d i f f e r e n t  k i n d s  of economic growth.  The ' s a t u r a t i o n '  
p r i n c i p l e  i d e n t i f i e d  t h e r e  i s  a u s e f u l ,  and p o t e n t i a l l y  v e r y  
i m p o r t a n t ,  c o n c e p t  which shou ld  be i n c l u d e d  i n  more a p p l i e d  
models of  r e g i o n a l  development .  T h i s  i s  viewed as t h e  f i r s t  i n  
a group of  p a p e r s  concerned w i t h  models of p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  
behav iour  i n  r e g i o n a l  development .  
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A b s t r a c t  
A fo rmal  micro-economic model of a  s imp le  d u a l i s t i c  
s p a t i a l  economy i s  o u t l i n e d .  The e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  
t o  t h i s  model i n c l u d e s  a  measure o f  p o p u l a t i o n  d e n s i t y  
whose l e v e l  i s  dependent  on t h e  t e c h n i c a l  pa ramete r s  of  
t h e  economy. Numerical exper iments  w i t h  t h e  model high- 
l i g h t  t h e  impor tance  o f  a  s a t u r a t i o n  p r i n c i p l e  i n  d e t e r -  
mining how economic growth a f f e c t s  t h e  s p a t i a l  p a t t e r n  
of p o p u l a t i o n  d e n s i t y .  Although t h e  model i s  a b s t r a c t ,  
t h e  s a t u r a t i o n  p r i n c i p l e  i s  s een  t o  be  a n  impor t an t  
concep t  f o r  f u t u r e  a p p l i e d  behav iou ra l  models of  r e g i o n a l  
development.  

ON DUALISTIC EQUILIBRIUM AND TECHNICAL 
CHANGE IN A SIMPLE HUElAN SETTLEMENT MODEL 
John R. Miron 
Settlement system p~licies can not be designed without 
models and theories of the processes which underly the current 
spatial pattern of population. The scarcity of empirical models 
of settlement systems would therefore seem to be incomprehensible 
given the current near-universal concern with such policies. 
However, this paucity reflects somewhat an inadequate theoretical 
basis for a policy-relevant applied model. The lack of a firm 
theory has in part been attributed to the complexity of dealing 
with a system whose elements usually have considerable locational 
flexibility. Where, for instance, can one find a model or theory 
which explains relocation processes caused by economic growth and 
technological change? 
The purpose of this paper is to make a contribution towards 
a theory of a settlement system. A model of a simple spatial 
economy is presented in which a spatial equilibrium distribution 
of population can be defined. This model is based on classical 
micro-economic theory and presumes a competitive land market 
wherein Ricardian land rents preserve the equilibrium. This model 
can be pursued in several interesting ways. Here, emphasis is 
placed on the implications for spatial density patterns of those 
parameter variations which might represent technical change and 
economic growth. It is shown that this formal micro-economic model 
gives several interesting deductions about the changes in spatial 
behaviour associated with economic development. The model empha- 
sizes differences among market areas and specifically the role 
played by a kind of market 'saturation'. 
T h e  model used in this paper contains twc kinds of economic 
units. The first is a factory, occupying a spaceless point, and 
producing a single output. The second is a set of farms with each 
using land and producing two goods (one land-using and the other 
a perfect substitute for the factory good). These farms are each 
c a p a b l e  o f  v a r y i n g  t h e  amount o f  l a n d  t h e y  u s e  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  
l o c a l  economic f a c t o r s  and it i s  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  s p a t i a l  d e n s i t y  
o f  fa rms which i s  o f  c e n t r a l  conce rn  i n  t h i s  p a p e r .  Two sub- 
models a r e  d e f i n e d ;  one  f o r  t h e  f a c t o r y  and one f o r  t h e  farm a t  
a  g i v e n  d i s t a n c e  from t h e  f a c t o r y .  These sub-models a r e  l i n k e d  
by p r i c e s  and market  e q u i l i b r i a  c o n d i t i o n s .  The e f f e c t  o f  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  change ( r e p r e s e n t e d  a s  p a r a m e t e r  v a r i a t i o n s )  i n  
e i t h e r  sub-model on t h e  s p a t i a l  d e n s i t y  o f  fa rms can  t h u s  be 
examined. 
I t  might  be  argued t h a t  a  model based  on fa rming  l ~ n i t s  i s  
n o t  v e r y  u s e f u l  t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  s e t t l e m e n t  sys tems  which a r e  
overwhelmingly urban i n  n a t u r e .  The L o s c h - C h r i s t a l l e r  models o f  
an  urban sys tem f o r  example emphasize m u l t i p l e  m a r k e t - t h r e s h o l d s  
i n  d e f i n i n g  h i e r a r c h i e s  o f  urban c e n t e r s .  However, t h e s e  same 
models b a s e  a l l  urban  s t r u c t u r e  on a  r u r a l  h i n t e r l a n d  which i s  
assumed t o  be  u n i f o r m l y  dense  t h r o u g h  s p a c e .  The p r e s e n t  model 
can  be viewed a s  t h e  r ep lacement  o f  t h i s  assumpt ion  by a  model o f  
t h e  h i n t e r l a n d  and a  l o w e s t - t h r e s h o l d  f a c t o r y  which endogenously 
d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  s p a t i a l  p a t t e r n  o f  fa rm d e n s i t i e s .  A t  t h e  same 
t i m e ,  t h i s  model can  i n  a g e n e r a l  s e n s e  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  e f f e c t  of  
a  c e n t r e  anywhere i n  t h e  u rban  h i e r a r c h y  on i t s  whole h i n t e r l a n d  
i n c l u d i n g  dominated  lower -o rde r  c e n t r e s .  Under e i t h e r  o f  t h e s e  
two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,  t h e  p r e s e n t  model i s  a  c o n t r i b u t i o n  toward 
a  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  s e t t l e m e n t  sys tems .  
I.  THE STUCTURE OF THE MODEL 
( a )  THE FARM SUB-MODEL : ASSUMPTIONS 
The farm sub-model used  i n  t h i s  pa-per h a s  been deve loped  by 
t h e  a u t h o r  i n  an  e a r l i e r  p a p e r .  l The a s s u m p t i o n s ,  d e f i n i t i o n s ,  
and hypo theses  from t h a t  paper  a r e  reviewed q u i c k l y  h e r e .  The 
s o l u t i o n  t o  t h i s  model i s  ex tended  t o  c o v e r  a  s p e c i a l  c o r n e r  
s o l u t i o n  c a s e  o f  some subsequen t  i n t e r e s t .  
Begin by assuming t h r e e  sets o f  a c t o r s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  v e r y  
l a r g e  homogenous p l a n e ;  ( i )  a  s i n g l e  f a c t o r y  a t  some f i x e d  space -  
l e s s  p o i n t  on t h e  p l a n e ,  (ii) a  v e r y  l a r g e  set  o f  farms occupying 
t h e  remainder  o f  t h i s  p l a n e  a t  an everywhere f i n i t e  d e n s i t y ,  and  
(iii) a  l a r g e  set o f  a b s e n t e e  ( f rom t h e  p l a n e )  l a n d l o r d s .  Each 
landlord is identical in certain respects. Each resides outside 
the region and also spends his land rent income there. Each 
attempts to maximize the rent received for his unit of land., 
However, each landlord behaves competitively in that there are 
no collusive agreements and no landlord possesses enough land 
to behave monopolistically. 
Each farm behaves as a unit maximizing its well-behaved 
utility function. Each has the same total amount of labour, h, 
which it allocates among activities in fulfilling this goal. 
Further, each farm (or labour unit as it might equally be referred 
to) can locate wherever it chooses If its bid rent is the highest 
offered for that site. Any relocation is itself assumed to be 
costless. Every farm is also free to choose the amount of land 
(L) to be occupied by it. Each has the same, strictly-convex, 
utility function (U) defining its preference orderings over 
consumption of two infinitely divisible goods; soap (XI and food 
(Y) . * Each produces a gross output of food, (Q) using labour 
(hy) and the land area of the farm as inputs with decreasing 
returns to scale. This gross output can be divided into rental 
payments, RL, and a remainder termed net food output, Y1. The 
farm also produces an output of soap, XI, which is tied solely 
to its labour input, hx, with constant returns to scale. Finally 
the farm can also allocate labour services to the factory in the 
amount of hZ units although the total labour constraint must not 
be exceeded. 
It is assumed that the factory offers to trade its own soap 
for farm food at a given mill price, Pb, where food is the nume- 
raire. With freight costs proportional to distance, the delivered 
price, P(s), increases with distance Is' from the factory. The 
farm at distance 's' offers to purchase an amount of soap, X2, 
from the factory for which it gives up P(s) X2 units of food. 
The factory also offers employment at a wage of wb units of food 
per unit of labour. Distance-proportional commuting costs 
decrease the net wage w(s), received by the farm. 
Finally, it is assumed that all farms are in a state of 
equilibrium such that there is no incentive for any farm to 
alter its location or production-consumption combinations. Given 
t h a t  t h e  farm o p t i m i z e s  i t s  production-consumption bundle  a t  any 
l o c a t i o n ,  t h e  R i c a r d i a n  r e n t  l e v e l ,  R ,  i s  such a s  t o  p e r m i t  each  
household t o  a c h i e v e  a t  b e s t  t h e  same l e v e l  o f  u t i l i t y  a t  eve ry  
l o c a t i o n .  
The s p e c i f i c  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  farm sub-model i s  o u t l i n e d  i n  
Tab le  1. Note t h a t  a l l  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  assumed t o  be  non-negat ive .  
F u r t h e r ,  t h e r e  i s  assumed t o  be a  uni form p o s i t i v e  l a n d  r e n t ,  R*, 
which forms a  f l o o r  f o r  a l l  l a n d  r e n t s  ( i . e . ,  R ( s )  > , R * ) .  
Tab le  1: S t r u c t u r a l  Equa t ions  i n  t h e  Farm Sub-Model. 
Source:  See t e x t  
( b )  THE FARM SUB-MODEL: SOLUTION 
The assumpt ions  of t h e  model r e n d e r  it an ' open '  model i n  
t h e  s e n s e  of  Wheaton ( 1 9 7 4 ) .  The uni form r e n t  R*, o c c u r r i n g  
w i t h o u t  t h e  f a c t o r y ,  c o n t i n u e s  t o  e x i s t  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  
f a c t o r y  a l t h o u g h  o n l y  o u t s i d e  i t s  market  a r e a s .  The f a c t o r y  i s  
s m a l l  enough t h a t  it h a s  no e f f e c t  on t h e s e  o u t l y i n g  a r e a s  even 
though d e n s i t y  and r e n t  l e v e l s  change w i t h i n  i t s  market  a r e a s .  
Because t h e  f a c t o r y  h a s  no e f f e c t  on c o n d i t i o n s  a t  o r  beyond 
i t s  l a r g e s t  market  boundary and because  t h e  t o t a l  number o f  farms 
w i t h i n  i t s  marke t  a r e a s  i s  v a r i a b l e ,  t h e  model i s  s a i d  t o  be  
open. 3 
A s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  Miron (1975,  pp. 155-156) ,  t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  
e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h i s  sub-model i g n o r i n g  a  p o s s i b l e  
c o r n e r  s o l u t i o n .  These  s o l u t i o n s  c o r r s s p o n d  t o  d i f f e r e n t  d i s t a n c e  
r a n g e s  from t h e  f a c t o r y .  A d i s t a n c e  s *  can  be  found beyond which 
t h e  d e l i v e r e d  p r i c e  o f  f a c t o r y  soap  i s  s o  h i g h  t h a t  e a c h  farm 
moves t o  a  s t a t e  o f  a u t a r k y  ( i . e . ,  X 2 = 0 ) .  Another  d i s t a n c e  s A 
can  be  d e f i n e d  beyond which t h e  farm chooses  n o t  t o  a l l o c a t e  any 
l a b o u r  t o  f a c t o r y  work ( i . e . ,  h  = O ) .  F o r  s i m p l i c i t y  o f  p resen-  
a z  t a t i o n ,  it i s  assumed t h a t  s < s * .  Thus ,  we may d e f i n e  an a u t a r k y  
A s o l u t i o n  where s & s * ,  an M1 s o l u t i o n  when s < s s s * ,  and an M2 
A market  s o l u t i o n  where o s s s  s . 
These s o l u t i o n s  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  e x t e n s i v e l y  i n  Miron (1975;  
pp. 156-162) and a r e  summarized h e r e  i n  T a b l e s  2 , 3 ,  and 4 .  The 
p r i n c i p a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  M1 and M 2  s o l u t i o n s  o c c u r  
because  o f  t h e  c o n s t a n t  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  o f  l a b o u r  i n  f a c t o r y  
work and i n  on-farm s o a p  p r o d u c t i o n .  Because t h e s e  a r e  c o n s t a n t ,  
t h e  farm engages  i n  a t  most  one  o f  t h e s e  two a c t i v i t i e s  a t  any 
g i v e n  d i s t a n c e  from t h e  f a c t o r y . 4  These  a r e  f a c t o r y  l a b o u r  i n  
t h e  M 2  zone and on-farm s o a p  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  M1 zone.  Thus i n  
t h e  M 2  s o l u t i o n  it i s  n o t e d  t h a t  hx and X I  a r e  z e r o  w h i l e  hz 
i s  z e r o  i n  t h e  M1 s o l u t i o n .  
A v e r y  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  M2 and M 1  marke t  
s o l u t i o n s  c a n  now b e  e s t a b l i s h e d .  I n  b o t h  m a r k e t s ,  t h e  t o t a l  
demand ( X )  f o r  s o a p  by any farm i s  i n e l a s t i c  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  t h e  d e l i v e r e d  ( o r  even  t h e  m i l l )  price.  I n  t h e  M 2  m a r k e t ,  
t h e  demand f o r  pu rchased  s o a p  ( X 2 )  i s  a l s o  i n e l a s t i c  b e c a u s e  
t h e  l a c k  o f  fa rm s o a p  p r o d u c t i o n  makes purchased  demand 
e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t o t a l  demand. I n  t h e  M 1  marke t ,  t h e r e  i s  some 
on-farm p r o d u c t i o n  o f  soap .  The demand f o r  pu rchased  s o a p  
h e r e  i s  more e l a s t i c  t h a n  i n  t h e  M 2  m a r k e t  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  between s o a p  p u r c h a s e s  and p r o d u c t i o n  
On t h e  farm.  Another  way t o  e x p r e s s  t h i s  i s  t o  sa:T t h a t  t h e  
Table 2: Autarky Solution ( s  > s * )  . 
- 
where 
Source: Miron (1975; pp. 156-1571. 
T a b l e  3 :  M1 M a r k e t  S o l u t i o n  (s: - < s  - < s * )  . 
w h e r e  
S o u r c e :  M i r o n  ( 1 9 7 5 ;  pp. 1 5 7 - 1 6 0 ) .  
A T a b l e  4 :  M Marke t  S o l u t i o n  ( 0  s s, ) .  2  
whe re  
S o u r c e :  Miron (1975 ;  pp. 160-162 ) .  
M 2  a r e a  i s  s a t u r a t e d  b e c a u s e  t h e  f a c t o r y  s u p p l i e s  a l l  t h e  s o a p  
consumed t h e r e  w h i l e  it s u p p l i e s  o n l y  a  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  s o a p  
m a r k e t  i n  t h e  M I  a r e a .  
( c )  THE FARM SUB-MODEL: CORNER SOLUTIONS 
Two problems emerge w i t h  t h i s  model by way o f  c o r n e r  s o l u -  
t i o n s .  The f i r s t  o c c u r s  where t h e  fa rm a l l o c a t e s  a l l  l a b o u r  t o  
food  p r o d u c t i o n  ( i . e . ,  h  = h ) .  I n  t h e  M 2  m a r k e t ,  it i s  n o t e d  t h a t  
Y 
h  i s  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  ' s '  w h i l e ,  i n  t h e  111 a r e a ,  it i s  Y 
d e c r e a s i n g .  Thus i f  h  e q u a l s  h  anywhere,  it o c c u r s  i n  a  band o f  
A Y 
s - v a l u e s  a round  s . I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h i s  c o r n e r  s o l u t i o n  emerses 
when s t  < s < s$ where t h e  l i m i t s  a r e  d e f i n e d  b y 6  
and  s u c h  t h a t  
A A (1.c)  st  , s A  and s ,  s s 
The two c o n d i t i o n s  i n  (1 .c)  c a n  b e  shown t o  b e  e q u i v a l e n t .  
W e  c a n  d e f i n e  a n  M 3  m a r k e t  a r e a ,  when (1 .c)  h o l d s ,  f o r  
A A 
sl < s < s 2 .  Such a n  a r e a  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F i g u r e  1. The s o l u -  
t i o n  f o r  e a c h  o p t i m i z e d  v a r i a b l e  c a n  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  i n  a  manner 
s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o u t l i n e d  i n  t h e  e a r l i z r  p a p e r .  The d e r i v e d  
o p t i m a l  s o l u t i o n s  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  T a b l e  5. Note t h a t  t h e  i n -  
e l a s t i c  demand f o r  f a c t o r y  s o a p  by a  fa rm i s  a f e a t u r e  s h a r e d  
w i t h  t h e  M 2  m a r k e t  s o l u t i o n .  I n  t h i s  s e n s e ,  b o t h  t h e  M 2  and M 3  
a r e a s  c a n  b e  t h o u g h t  t o  have  s a t u r a t e d  demands f o r  soap .  
An 143 m a r k e t  a r e a  need  n o t  e x i s t  i n  t h i s  model.  I t  i s  j u s t  
one  p o s s i b i l i t y .  However, f o r  s i m p l i c i t y  o f  p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  w e  
s h a l l  assume t h a t  it a lways  e x i s t s .  I n  t h e  c a s e  where it d o e s n ' t ,  
A A t b e  v a l u e s  sl and s 2  c a n  b e  t h o u g h t  t o  conve rge  t o  sA s o  t h a t  t h e  
M 3  m a r k e t  v a n i s h e s .  
The measure  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  d e n s i t y  u s e d  i n  t h i s  p a p e r  is h/L. 
T h i s  c a n  b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t h e  t o t a l  number o f  l a b o u r  u n i t s  ( e . g . ,  
man-hours) p e r  u n i t  a r e a .  T h i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  
number o f  f a rms  p e r  u n i t  a r e a .  An example o f  how h/L behaves  i n  
t h e  d i f f e r e n t  m a r k e t  a r e a s  i s  d i s p l a y e d  i n  F i g u r e  2 .  T h i s  example 
i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  m o n o t o n i c a l l y - d e c l i n i n g  d e n s i t i e s  w i t h  d i s t a n c e  
I 1 n . 
I I 
I 
S 
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Figure 1. Food labour input as a function of 
distance from the factory; base run 
solution. 
n n 
T a b l e  5:  Mj Market  S o l u t i o n  (s l  < s - < s 2 ) .  
B - l / ~  L = ( b h  gc ( s )  l/Y 
where 
Source :  S e e  t e x t .  
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Figure 2. Population density as a function of 
distance from factory when ko = 5.0. 
found in the M, and M, areas in contrast to the M, zone where the 
density is increasing. As argued in the earlier paper, density 
always increases with distance for at least some range of dis- 
tances adjacent to s* in the MI market. 
The second corner solution problem is much more difficult to 
reconcile. This problem occurs when the farm allocates all labour 
to the factory. This is significant because farms near the factories 
would no longer consume any land, the density of population would 
then become infinite, and a utility equilibrium could not be main- 
tained by a scheme of Ricardian land rentse7 The model loses its 
interpretability in such a situation. In the results described 
in the remainder of this paper, attention was paid to ensure that 
such a sclution was not approximzted. 8 
(d) THE FACTORY SUB-MODEL 
In specifying a model of producer behaviour in space, two 
important choices have to be made. In both cases, the simpler 
option has been chosen. The first choice concerns an assumption 
about the existence of competition. Two equilibrium cases are 
usually considered in the literature; pure monopoly and spatial 
monopolistic competition. The former assumes the factory to be 
the only one on the plane while the latter assumes many identical 
factories (equally spaced) with the smallest overlapping areas 
such that all consumers are served.' The difference involves both 
(i) treatment of the firm's boundary which moves from a circle 
in pure monopoly to a hexagon in monopolistic competition and (ii) 
the determination of optimal behaviour at this boundary. The pure 
monopoly case is assumed here because of its relative simplicity 
although the Christaller and Loschian models, for example, are 
based on monopolistic competition. 
The second choice to be made concerns the pricing behaviour 
of the firm. Two common alternatives are to assume either that 
the firm sets a fixed mill price or that it engages in spatial 
price discrimination. Beckman (1968) shows that the latter is 
usually more profitable as a pricing strategy. However, the mill 
pricing case is assumed here because of its simplicity and its 
frequent occurrence in reality. 
TO introduce producer behaviour, we need only add production 
and profit functions to the above assumptions. A simple pro- 
duction function relating factory output, Z, to labour input, N, 
is used. Further, the profit level (T) is the difference between 
the output sales and the sum of fixed costs (Co) and labour costs. 
The relationship between the mill wage-price combination and the 
output-demand and labour-supply levels is determined from the farm 
sub-model. Such relationships, presuming circular markets, are 
described in Table 6. 
The factory has the freedom to choose only one of the four 
variables (Pb, wb, Z, and N) within its domain in maximizing 
profits. The constraints A, C, and D in Table 6 simultaneously 
determine all three remaining variables. Further, it is noted 
from Tables 3, 4, and 5 that both Z and N in Table 6 are each 
jointly dependent on both the mill wage and the price of the 
factory. Changes in Pb for example affect both the demand for 
soap and the labour supply made available. 
Table 6: The Factory Sub-Model 
A. Production 
Z = KoN 6 
B. Profits 
b T = P b Z - C o - W N  
C. Demand 
A 
z = 2lT (sX2/~) ds + 2~ 
D. Labour Supply 
Source: See Text 
( e )  NUMERICAL RESOLUTION OF THE MODEL 
I f  o n e  a t t e m p t s  t o  a n a l y t i c a l l y  d e t e r m i n e  o p t i m a l  f a c t o r y  
b e h a v i o u r  i n  t h i s  sub-model,  a  problem emerges i n  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  
o f  t h e  i n t e g r a l s  i n  T a b l e  6 .  C o n s i d e r  t h e  demand e q u a t i o n  a s  a n  
example.  S u b s t i t u t i n g  from T a b l e s  3 ,  4 ,  and 5 ,  t h e  o u t p u t  de -  
mand e q u a t i o n  r e d u c e s  t o  t h a t  shown i n  T a b l e  7 .  The t h i r d  and 
f i n a l  i n t e g r a l  t e r m  i n  t h i s  e x p r e s s i o n  p o s e s  a n  immedia te  prob-  
l e m .  I t  c a n  b e  b r o k e n  i n t o  a  sum o f  i n t e g r a l s  whose t y p i c a l  
s t r u c t u r e  e a c h  i s  a s  f o l l o w s  
where m ,  n ,  and p  a r e  h e r e  c o n s t a n t s .  
Accord ing  t o  Gradsh teyn  and Ryzhik (1965;  page  711,  no g e n e r a l  
m a t h e m a t i c a l  s o l u t . i o n  e x i s t s  f o r  s u c h  a n  i n t e g r a l .  10  
A n u m e r i c a l  p r o c e d u r e  must  b e  drawn upon t o  a p p r o x i m a t e  
a t  l e a s t  p a r t  o f  t h e  i n t e g r a l  i n  T a b l e  7 .  The g e n e r a l i z e d  
S impson ' s  Ru le  h a s  been  used  f o r  t h e  n u m e r i c a l  r e s u l t s  d e -  
s c r i b e d  below. T h i s  method i s  used  t o  a p p r o x i m a t e  t h e  f i r s t  
and t h i r d  ( c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t h e  M ,  and M, m a r k e t s  r e s p e c t i v e l y )  
i n t e g r a l s  i n  T a b l e  7 a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  l a b o u r  s u p p l y  i n t e g r a l  
( c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t h e  M, a r e a )  of  T a b l e  6.  12 
An example o f  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c y  be tween t h e  a c t u a l  i n t e g r a l  
and  t h e  a p p r o x i m a t i o n  i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  F i g u r e  3 .  Here t h e  Labour 
s u p p l y  i n t e g r a l  i s  e s t i m a t e d  by a  sum o f  10 r e c t a n g u l a r  b l o c k s  
a s  shown. The e r r o r  i n  a p p r o x i m a t i o n  u s u a l l y  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  o n  
t h e  o r d e r  o f  2 . 0  t o  2 .5  p e r  c e n t .  13  
Given  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  n u m e r i c a l  a n a l y s i s ,  a  s y s t e m a t i c  
method f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  v i r t u a l l y - i n f i n i t e  a r r a y  of p o s s i b l e  
p a r a m e t e r  c o m b i n a t i o n s  i s  r e q u i r e d .  The method used  h e r e  b e g i n s  
by d e f i n i n g  a  b a s e  r u n  s e t  o f  p a r a m e t e r  v a l u e s .  Then, e x p e r i -  
men t s  c a n  b e  d e f i n e d  i n  which o n e  o r  more o f  t h e s e  p a r a m e t e r s  
a r e  v a r i e d  w h i l e  t h e  r e s t  a r e  h e l d  a t  t h e i r  b a s e  r u n  v a l u e s .  

Labour Supply Density 
1 2 3 4 
distance 
Figure 3. Approximation of factory labour 
supply; base run solution. 
( f )  THE BASE RUN AND ITS INTERPRETATION 
Such a n  a p p r o a c h  makes t h e  c h o i c e  of a  b a s e  r u n  q u i t e  impor- 
t a n t  b e c a u s e  a l l  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t s  d e s c r i b e d  below a r e  b a s e d  on  
v a r i a t i o n s  o f  it. The p a r t i c u l a r  v a l u e s  u s e d  i n  t h e  b a s e  r u n  
a r e  d e s c r i b e d  i n  T a b l e  8 and  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  s o l u t i o n  i s  summa- 
r i z e d  i n  T a b l e  9.  An i n t u i t i v e  f ee l  c a n  b e  l e n t  t o  t h i s  b a s e  
r u n  by examining  some o f  t h e s e  v a l u e s .  I t  i s  n o t e d ,  f o r  i n -  
s t a n c e ,  t h a t  t h e  low v a l u e  f o r  a s u g g e s t s  t h a t  f a r m s  consume a  
l a r g e  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e i r  r e a l  income i n  f o o d .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  v a l u e  
o f  y i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  e a c h  f a r m  s p e n d s  h a l f  o f  i t s  g r o s s  food  o u t -  
p u t  i n  l a n d  r e n t  c h a r g e s .  The v a l u e  o f  h  i s  set  a s  t h e  a v e r a g e  
number o f  man-hours worked by two p e r s o n s  i n  o n e  y e a r .  The 
a u t a r k y  l a n d  r e n t ,  R * ,  i s  set  a s  $9600 p e r  s q u a r e  m i l e  ( o r  
a b o u t  $37 p e r  h e c t a r e )  p e r  y e a r .  
I n  t h e  s o l u t i o n ,  t h e s e  p a r a m e t e r s  g e n e r a t e  a  r e l a t i v e l y  
s m a l l  l a b o u r  s h e d  r a d i u s  of  4.19 m i l e s  ( 6 . 7  km) a n d  a n  o u t p u t  
m a r k e t  a r e a  r a d i u s  o f  27.85 m i l e s  (44 .8  krn).  F u r t h e r ,  a b o u t  
t w o - t h i r d s  o f  t h e  demand f o r  f a c t o r y  s o a p  i s  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  
t h e  M2 and  M 3  m a r k e t s  where ,  it h a s  been  n o t e d ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
f a r m ' s  demand f o r  s o a p  i s  i n e l a s t i c .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  a v e r a g e  
d e n s i t y  ( t o t a l  man-hours i n  t h e  m a r k e t  a r e a  d i v i d e d  by t o t a l  
m a r k e t  a r e a )  d i f f e r s  marked ly  f rom a r e a  t o  a r e a .  I n  a u t a r k y  
t h e  f a r m  consumes .0499 s q u a r e  m i l e s  ( 1 2 . 9  h e c t a r e s )  so t h a t  
t h e  a v e r a g e  d e n s i t y  t h e r e  i s  80,160  man-hours p e r  s q u a r e  m i l e  
( o r  309.4 man-hours p e r  h e c t a r e ) .  Thus,  t h e  a v e r a g e  d e n s i t y  
i n  t h e  Mg and  M; a r e a s  i s  l ower  t h a n  t h e  a u t a r k y  d e n s i t y  w h i l e  
t h e  M2 a v e r a g e  d e n s i t y  is  c o n s i d e r a b l y  h i g h e r .  
The b a s e  r u n  s o l u t i o n  emphas i zes  a  p r i m a r i l y  r u r a l  economy 
i n  a n  e a r l y  p h a s e  o f  deve lopmen t .  Farm r e n t  payments  are  h i g h  
r e l a t i v e  t o  incomes .  F r e i g h t  c o s t s  r e s t r i c t  t h e  m a r k e t  area 
o f  t h e  f a c t o r y  q u i t e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  Food consumpt ion  a c c o u n t s  
f o r  w e l l  o v e r  h a l f  o f  t h e  t o t a l  b u d g e t  o f  e a c h  f a rm.  T h i s  k i n d  
o f  e a r l y - d e v e l o p m e n t  s o l u t i o n  i s  t h e  mos t  a p p r o p r i a t e  g i v e n  t h e  
a s s u m p t i o n s  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  f a rm sub-model i n  s u b s e c t i o n  I ( a )  
above .  
T a b l e  8 :  B a s e  Run P a r a m e t e r  V a l u e s  
A. CONSUMER PREFERENCES. D. FREIGHT AND COMMUTING COSTS 
B. FOOD PRODUCTION E .  OTHER FARM PARAMETERS 
C.  DOMESTIC SOAP PRODUCTION F .  FACTORY SOAP PRODUCTION 
T z b l e  9 :  S o l u t i o n  f o r  B a s e  Run 
A. T h e  f ac to ry  and i t s  m a r k e t  areas 
O p t i m a l  P r i c e  = 0 . 2 2 2  O p t i m a l  Wage = 0 . 0 9 1 6  
M a r k e t  A r e a  
M2 M3 M1 T o t a l  
O u t e r  R a d i u s  4 . 1 9  1 6 . 9 6  2 7 . 8 5  ---- 
O u t p u t  Demand ( 0 0 0  I s )  6 7 6  3 9 5 8  2 3 0 5  6 9 3 9  
F a c t o r y  L a b o u r  ( 0 0 0  s)  3 1 3 3  ---- ---- 3 1 3 3  
T o t a l  L a b o u r  ( 0 0 0 ' s )  7 5 4 2  6 5 6 7 5  1 1 6 2 1 0  1 8 9 4 2 8  
A v e r a g e  D e n s i t y  ( 0 0 0  I s )  1 3 6 . 5  7 7 . 4  7 5 . 8  7 7 . 8  
B. T h e  F a r m  i n  A u t a r k y  
11. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
It is possible to vary any of the parameters in either of 
the two sub-models, measure the change in the optimal mill wage- 
price combination, and determine the implications of this for 
the average density within the factory's various market areas. 
Here, we choose to examine variations only in three parameters; 
KO, 6, and b. The first two of these are scale and labour elas- 
ticity parameters respectively in the factory's production function. 
Changes in them might reflect changes in the firm's capital 
stock or technology. The final one is a scale parameter in the 
farm's production function reflecting its level of agricultural 
capital stock or technology. 
In all cases, the experimental results are described in a 
similar two-part manner. First, the effects of parameter vari- 
ations on the optimal wage-price combination are described and 
explained. Then, the implications of these wage-price variations 
for the spatial pattern of population are discussed. This pro- 
cedure emphasizes the fact that it is only through the wage and 
price variables that the farm sub-model (and thus population 
density) reacts to the factory sub-model. 
(a) VARIATION OF THE FACTORY SCALE PARAMETER: WAGE PRICE 
EFFECTS 
Variations in K have interesting effects on the levels of 
0 
wage and price chosen by the firm. Consider the following experi- 
ment where all parameters are given their base run values with the 
14 
exception of KO whose value is varied from 1.0 to 20.0 . The 
resultant wage-price combinations as a function of the value of K 
0 
are displayed in Figure 4. As shown in that figure, the profit- 
maximizing price declines monotonically with increasing KO although 
2 
a Pb / ~ K A  is positive. The wage level, however, is at first an 
increasing, then a decreasing, function of KO. What causes Pb to 
decline so quickly at first and then almost level out? What does 
this have to do with the non-monotonic behaviour of wb? 
To answer these questions, it is useful to estimate the price 
elasticity of demand, C. 
- 6  
price 
.5 
-4  
-3 
-2 
01 
D .  
.I10 
wage 
Figure 9.  Effect of changes in KO on the wage-price 
combination. 
This elasticity is a function of both the wage and price chosen. 
Using the base-run parameters in the farm sub-model, this elas- 
ticity has been estimated for a net of Pb - wb values where 
0.18 < Pb'< 0.56 (increments of 0.01) and 0.075 < w b <  0.110 (incre- 
ments of 0.001). The estimated elasticities are presented 
graphically in Figure 5 where the mill price is measured along 
Oa, the mill wage along Ob and the elasticity along bc. l5 The 
estimates range from a low of 0.900 (Pb = 0.18, wb = 0.077) to 
a high of 6.29 (Pb = 0.56, wb = 0.095). From Figure 5, it is 
seen both that at a high mill price (regardless of the wage level) 
demand is very elastic and that at lower prices demand becomes 
increasingly inelastic. 
The effect of increasing KO on the factory's wage-price 
choice can now be intuitively explained. As the firm experiences 
an increase in KO, it can be expected to react in a combination 
of two ways; decreasing its price and increasing revenues or 
decreasing its wage and its costs to take advantage of its en- 
hanced productiveness. Initially, when Pb is high, an increment 
in KO is reflected primarily in a price reduction because demand 
is quite elastic. As KO becomes larger and Pb smaller, increments 
to KO are not reflected in sizable decreases in Pb because demand 
is inelastic at these Pb values. Instead, the wage offer is 
reduced. 
What causes demand to become inelastic at these lower Pb 
values? The answer lies in the shifting composition of the 
factory's output market. The elasticity of demand observed by 
the factory is partly dependent on the relative number of farms 
in the M2 and M3 areas as compared with the M I  area. As indicated 
earlier each farm in the former area has an inelastic demand while 
each in the latter has a more elastic demand. The proportion of 
output demand in the M2 and M 3  areas is displayed in Figure 6 for 
the case of the present experiment. This proportion, f i l ,  declines 
initially until about KO = 1.75 and then increases monotonically. 
The shape of this curve reflects the monotonically declining pro- 
portion of the market in the M 2  area and the monotonically increasing 
proportion of the M 3  area above KO = 1.75 (where it initially 
appears). In effect, with an increasing value of KO, the factory 
Figure 5. The elasticity of demand (€1 as a 
function of price (oa) and wage (ob) 
using base-run parameters. 
F i g u r e  6 .  P r o p o r t i o n  of marke t  w i t h i n  M2 and M3 
a r e a s  ($1  and t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  of  demand 
(€) a s  f u n c t i o n s  o f  KO. 
finds its output market increasingly 'saturated' with individually- 
inelastic farms. This accounts for its increasingly inelastic 
market demand. 
(b) VARIATION OF THE FACTORY SCALE PARAMETER: WAGE-PRICE 
INTERACTION 
We have specified in an intuitive manner how the wage and 
price offers of the firm are inter-related as KO is increased. 
To make a more specific or formal statement about their inter- 
connections, it is useful to consider momentarily a somewhat 
simpler model than that found in Table 6. Specifically, let us 
consider the model outlined in Table 10. 
This simple model differs from the one of Table 6 in that 
the output demand and labour supply relations have been made more 
tractable. In Table 6, Z responds to the mill price but not with 
a fixed elasticity as found in T3ble 10. Also, Z responds some- 
what to wb in the full model and this effect is ignored in the 
simple model. The simple model posits that both the mill price 
and wage have an effect on the labour supply as is implicit in 
Table 6. However, constant elasticities nave been used when 
these are variable in the full model. Finally, the wage elasti- 
city of labour supply is assumed to be larger than the price 
elasticity ($I> $2) in absolute value and this is in keeping with 
numerical results obtained in experiments with the full model. 
The solution to the full model can be expressed in terms 
of the effects of KO. We concentrate here on Z and wb. From 
Table 10, it is seen that the optimal output level is a monotoni- 
cally increasing function of KO regardless of the parameter values 
chosen. From the output demand equation, this implies that Pb is 
monotonically declining with respect to KO. 
However, the behaviour of the mill wage is not so clear. The 
exponent of KO here has a sign which depends on the value of 
(4.a) ( a - 1  - 82 
Here, wb is an increasing or decreasing function of KO as (a-l)-B2 
is greater or less then zero. For wb to be an increasing function 
of KO, the output demand elasticity (a) must be sufficiently 
large to offset the price elasticity of labour supply (82). In 
other words, if the labour supply is very responsive to the output 
Table 10: A simple model of monopolistic behaviour in inter- 
dependent markets 
A. THE MODEL 
(i) MAXIMIZE: PROFIT LEVEL 
= PbZ - wbN 
(ii) SUBJECT TO: 
(a) OUTPUT DEMAND 
-a Z = aoPb (ao > 0; a < 1) 
(b) PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
Z = KoN 6 (KO > 0; 0 < 6 < 1) 
(c) LABOUR SUPPLY 
81 -82 N = bowb pb (81 > 82 > 0) 
B. SOLUTION 
(i) OPTIMAL OUTPUT 
(ii) OPTIMAL WAGE 
[~-1-~2]/u 0 
Wb = C KO 
where To = a + a(1-6)Bi + (B1-B2) 6 > O  
and cO, c1 are constants. 
price, the firm may find that a lower wage offer will still gain 
enough labour to produce the required output at the new, lower, 
optimal price. 
TWO observations can now be made with respect to the full 
model. First, since the elasticities are not fixed in the full 
model, there may be regions of the Pb - wb space in which 
a - 1 - B2 > 0 and regions in which it is not. Experimental 
work tends to suggest that a increases rapidly with Pb but that 
B 1  varies only slightly so that a - 1 - B2 < 0 can ususally be 
expected where Pb is low. 16 Secondly, the simple model indicates 
that it is strictly this feedback effect of the mill price on the 
labour supply which generates the observed non-monotonic rela- 
tionship between the mill wage and KO. 
(c) VARIATION OF THE FACTORY SCALE PARAMETER: DENSITY EFFECTS 
To understand the implications of Figure 4 for the density 
of farms, it is necessary to re-examine Tables 3 through 5. With- 
in the three market areas, the distance-specific density levels 
are as follows 
(5.b) h/L = h -Jlf ('+B)lr bl, [ gc (s)] 
First, note that variations in the mill wage affect only the 
densities in the M2 area and the boundary between the M2 and its 
adjacent market area. Density can be seen to be an increasing 
function of the mill wage in the M2 market. l7 In the M2 and M3 
markets, density is a decreasing function of the mill price. In 
the MI market, an increase in the mill price may increase or de- 
crease the density level at any distance as argued in Miron (1975; 
pp. 158-159). Thus the implication of Figure 4 for density levels 
may well be different in each of the three market areas facing the 
firm. 
Three distance-specific density functions (corresponding 
to KO values of 1.0, 5.0, and 10.0) are illustrated in Figure 
7. As seen from Figure 4, relative to the wb value at KO = 1.0, 
wb is larger at KO = 5.0 and smaller at KO = 10. The mill 
price at the same time is monotonically decreasing. The changes 
in density are in accordance with the wage-price changes. In 
the M2 market, the density level increases as KO changes from 
1.0 to 5.0 but then declines for KO = 10. An M j  area does 
not exist for KO = 1.0 but density is increasing in this area 
from KO = 5.0 to KO = 10.0. Within the M I  area densities are 
shifting downward (and to the right in Figure 7) as KO increases. 
Figure 7 presents an awkward format for the solution to this 
model when KO is given a number of different values. It is useful 
to summarize the solution in terms of the average density within 
each market. The average density {h/Lji in market i is defined 
as follows 
Here, Gl,i and L2,i are the inner and outer radii of the i'th 
market. In Figure 8 are presented the average densities in each 
market as £unctions of KO. 
It is noted that the average density in the M2 market peaks 
near Ko=6. However, from Figure 4, the mill wage peaks near 
Ko=1.8. The reason that I h / ~ j ~  continues to increase for KO 
between 1.8 and 6.0 is that the rate of price decline has an 
effect on density levels which more than offsets effects of the 
rate of wage decline. Thus, one might expect in general that 
{h/I,)2 will always peak at a higher value of KO than does the 
mill wage. 
densit 
( 000.0J0) 
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Figure 7. Effect of alternate KO values on the 
equilibrium density of population by 
distance. 
average 
densi t y 
(000) 
Figure 8. Average density in M 2 r  3 ,  and MI 
markets as a function of KO. 
It is also noted that Ih/1,1~ and { h / ~ ~ }  have s. monotonic 
behaviour with respect to KO that could be expected from Figure 
4. Both appear to be approaching asymptotic limits for large 
values of KO. Also, these variables move in opposite directions. 
It seems reasonable to conclude from these experimental 
results that the effect of a scale change in the factory's pro- 
duction function on the population density pattern is a complex 
one. Within the different market areas of the factory, different 
kinds of behaviour can be expected. Further, these effects may 
or may not be monotonic. However, these effects are all expli- 
cable within the terms of the model used. 
(d) VARIATION OF THE FACTORY LABOUR ELASTICITY PARAMETER 
The second set of experiments conducted with this model 
concern the effect of variations in 8. A range of 8-values 
from 0.65 to 1.06 are used and for each value the optimal wage- 
price combination is found. l8 The wage and price levels for each 
8 are depicted in Figure 9 where all other parameters have been 
held to the base run values. These solutions bear a substantial 
correspondence to those for the KO variations in Figure 4. The 
most interesting difference concerns the second derivatives of 
Pb and wb in the present case. Here, Pb has an inflection point 
whereas earlier it did not while wb has two such points compared 
to one earlier. 
These price and wage characteristics have important conclu- 
sions for the associated density patterns. The M p  market is most 
affected by the slowly changing wage and price levels near 8=0.65. 
In Figure 10, the average density in the M2 zone is seen to in- 
crease very slowly at first. For 8 between about 0.75 and 0.85, 
there is a rapid growth in I h / ~ l ~  reflecting the quickly rising 
wb and quickly falling Pb. Thus, if the Pb-wb pattern of Figure 9 
is representative, it indicates that there will be a small inter- 
mediate range of 6 values over which the Mp density will be very 
sensitive to variations. In the MI market, density is affected 
only by Pb and the solution depicted in Figure 10 has a shape 
similar to that of the mill price solution in Figure 9. The M 3  
area density, on the other hand, has a monotonically increasing 
density over the range of 8 values for which it exists. 
wage 
-11 
Figure 9. The optimal wage-price combination 
when 6 is varied from 0.65 to 1.06. 
F i g u r e  10 .  A v e r a g e  d e n s i t y  i n  t h e  t h r e e  m a r k e t  
areas as 6 i s  v a r i e d  f r o m  0 . 6 5  t o  1 . 0 6 .  
With the exception of their second derivative behaviour, 
these density solutions are very similar to those of Figure 8 
where KO is varied. In both cases, Ih/~)2 is the most volatile 
density; at first increasing and then decreasing. The Mg area 
density is monotonically increasing in both cases while the M1 
density is monotonically declining. 
(e) SIMULTANEOUS VARIATION OF 6 AND KO 
Given the effect of varying 6 and KO individually in the 
previous two experiments, it is interesting to investigate the 
effect of varying both parameters simultaneously. One method of 
implementing this experiment is to carry out several sets of 
experiments similar to the first one where KO is varied and in 
which 6 is varied from one set to the next. These experimental 
results are summarized in Figure 11 which depicts the optimal mill 
wage-price combination as a function of KO for 6=0.8 and 6=0.9. 
The impact of a change in 6 while KO is increasing can now be 
seen. Larger values of 6 cause wb to become more sharply peaked 
as a function of KO. Further, wb achieves a larger maximum while 
the mill price falls more rapidly (as a function of KO) for higher 
6 values. The resultant a.verage densities in Figure 12 reflect 
these wage-price patterns. An increase in 6 causes I ~ / L ) ~  to peak 
sooner and to have a larger maximum value. Further, this increase 
causes Ih/l;Il and 2 to reach the same asymptotes as before 
but at a faster rate. 
(f) VARIATION OF THE FARM FOOD SCALE PARAMETER 
To this point, all experiments have been concerned with 
technical change at the factory level. It is reasonable to ask 
if changes in the farm's prod~ictive capacity have analogous effects 
on densities. Before such an experiment can be carried out, it is 
noted that a change in one of the farm's parameters changes the 
nature of the autarky solution as well as the various market solu- 
tions. However, we are primarily interested in the market solu- 
tions relative to the autarky solution. Therefore, we standardize 
here for autarky changes by considering a relative price (Pb/P*), 
a relative wage (wb/cP*), and a relative average density 
({h/~~i / I~/L.} * ) .I9 
-5 
price 
-3 
-1 
wage 
-10 ' 
F i g u r e  1 1 .  P r i c e  and wage a s  f u n c t i o n s  o f  KO g i v e n  
6 = 0 . 8  and 6 = 0 . 9 .  
Figure 12. Average Density in the M2, M3, and MI 
markets as a function of K 3 = 0.8 
0' 
and 3 = 0.9. 
In the base run solution, b is set at 900.0. An experiment 
is undertaken in which b is varied from 400.0 to 1700.0. 20 The 
resultant relative wage and price are depicted in Figure 13. It 
is immediately noted that there is very little change in these 
solutions as b is altered. The effects of these solutions on the 
average relative densities are displayed in Figure 14. These 
indicate that the small relative wage-price changes have very 
little effect on densities in any of the market areas relative 
to what is happening in autarky. 
 his is more surprising in view of the large absolute effect 
b-variztions have on both the autarky solution and the market area 
solutions. For exanple, the lot size in autarky, L*, grows expo- 
nentially with b as shown in Figure 14 even though the relative 
densities change little. It should be concluded that b-variations 
have significant effects on solutions both inside and outside the 
factory's market area but appears to have little differential 
(or relative) effect between the two. 
111. CONCLUSIONS 
A formal micro-economic model of a single dualistic spatial 
economy has been outlined. The equilibrium solution to this 
model includes a measure of population density whose level is 
dependent on, among other coefficients, the technical parameters 
of the economy. Because the model is solvable only through 
numerical approximation, several experiments have been described 
in which various model technical parameters are changed. The 
experimental findings bear out the view that population density 
does not change uniformly through space with respect with changes 
in these parameters. These findings suggest that it is difficult 
to make simple statements about the effect of technical change on 
spatial patterns of population density without a careful speci- 
fication of the kind of market areas involved. 
The model presented is of a very particular structure but 
the essentials of it are germane to almost any model, empirical 
or theoretical, of spatial population patterns. In this model, 
an improved factory technology enables the factory to expand its 
market areas. This is done to some extent by stripping away local 
rel. 
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0.3 
F i g u r e  14.  R e l a t i v e  d e n s i t y  of  popu l a t i on  and farm s i z e  
a s  b i s  v a r i e d  from 400 t o  1 7 0 0 .  
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F i g u r e  1 3 .  Optimal wage and p r i c e  a s  b i s  v a r i e d  
from 400 t o  1700. 
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production in hinterland areas and encouraging more specialization 
in agriculture in these areas. As this process continues, the 
central factory faces a dimrninishing elasticity of demand. The 
facfory's demand is most elastic when its market is dominated by 
farms who are not completely specialized in agriculture. As the 
factory decreases its mill price, its output market becomes more 
and more saturated (and inelastic) in that a larger proportion of 
farms are completely specialized. It is this aspect of spatial 
economic development which is emphasized in the model and which is 
relevant to virtually any economic model of spatial population 
patterns. 
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Miron (1975) 
The u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  s t r i c t l y  convex i n  t h a t  t h e  a s s o c i -  
a t e d  i n d i f f e r e n c e  c u r v e s  a r e  s t r i c t l y  convex w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  t h e  o r i g i n .  
The u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  does  n o t  i n c l u d e  l a n d  a r e a  a s  an a rgu-  
ment. Thus t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  l i m i t  t o  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a b i l i t y  
of t h i s  model which i s  d i s c u s s e d  below. 
The model i s  a l s o  open i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  l a n d  r e n t  ( and ,  
l a t e r ,  f a c t o r y  p r o f i t s ) ,  a r e  l e a k a g e s  from it. 
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  cor respondence  between t h e  M2 and M I  s o l u t i o n s  
a r e  s e e n  when it i s  a p p r e c i a t e d  t h a t  t h e  m a r g i n a l  v a l u e  
p r o d u c t  o f  l a b o u r  i s  w ( s )  i n  t h e  former  and c P ( s )  i n  t h e  
l a t t e r .  
From t h e  t o t a l  soap  demand e q u a t i o n s  i n  T a b l e s  3 and 4 ,  t h e  
e l a s t i c i t y  i n  b o t h  marke t s  i s  a-1. T h i s  i n e l a s t i c  demand 
r e f l e c t s  t h e  s p e c i f i c  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  used.  
C o n d i t i o n  ( 1 . b )  i g  a  n o n - l i n e a r  e q u a t i o n  which i s  s o l v e d  
n u m e r i c a l l y  f o r  sl  . 
These  problems can  be  avo ided  by i n t r o d u c i n g  r e s i d e n t i a l  
l a n d  e x p l i c i t l y  i n t o  t h e  f a r m ' s  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  T h i s  h a s  
n o t  been under taken  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  uork  because  i t  g r e a t l y  
i n c r e a s e s  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of  d e r i v i n g  numer ica l  s o l u t i o n s  
w i t h o u t  a  c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y  b e t t e r  i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  model. 
The c o n d i t i o n  t h e  L > o  everywhere r e q u i r e s ,  from T a b l e  4 ,  
t h a t  
T h i s  c o n d i t i o n  w i l l  always  be  s a t i s f i e d .  A s  t h e  f a c t o r y  
r a i s e s  i t s  m i l l  wage toward k  pE/h, it f i n d s  t h a t  any 
d e s i r e d  l e v e l  of employment can  b e  g e n e r a t e d .  The main 
concern  i n  e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n  was n o t  t h a t  L would a c t u a l l y  
d r o p  t o  z e r o  b u t  t h a t  it would s imply  become ' t o o '  s m a l l .  
Refer  t o  S t e r n  (1972) f o r  a  d i s c u s s i o n  of  p roducer  behav iour  
i n  e i t h e r  c a s e  g i v e n  a uniform s p a t i a l  demand. 
Although s o l u t i o n s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  where one  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
i s  an  i n t e g e r ;  P I  ( m  + l ) / n ,  ( ( m  + l ) / n )  + p  . 
See Davis  and Rabinowitz (1975; pp 45-48) f o r  a  d e s c r i p t i o n  
of  t h e  method. 
12. There  a r e  10 i n t e r v a l s  used i n  e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  M2 a r e a  i n -  
t e g r a l s  f o r  o u t p u t  demand and l a b o u r  supp ly  and 20 i n t e r -  
v a l s  used i n  e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  M 1  market  i n t e g r a l  f o r  o u t p u t  
demand. (The midd le  i n t e g r a l  of  Tab le  7 has  a  s imple  e x a c t  
a n a l y t i c a l  s o l u t i o n ) .  The d i f f e r e n c e  h e r e  r e f l e c t s  t h e  
u s u a l  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of  t h e  two a r e a s  t o  t h e  t o t a l  
o u t p u t  demand. 
13. T h i s  e r r o r  c a n  be  reduced by i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  number of  ap- 
p rox imat ion  i n t e r v a l .  Only 10 o r  20 a r e  used i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  
s t u d y  because  o f  t h e  e x t e n s i v e  computing t i m e  r e q u i r e d  t o  
s o l v e  t h e  model f o r  a  g i v e n  s e t  of  pa ramete r  v a l u e s .  I n  
t h e  computer  program used ,  a  p r e - d e f i n e d  s e t  o f  m i l l  p r i c e s  
a r e  scanned t o  f i n d  t h e  o p t i m a l  p r i c e .  For  each m i l l  p r i c e ,  
t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  a p p r o p r i a t e  wage must  be  found v i a  a n  
i t e r a t i v e  p rocedure  i n v o l v i n g  u s u a l l y  a b o u t  10 i t e r a t i o n s .  
S i n c e  u s u a l l y  a b o u t  25 m i l l  p r i c e s  a r e  scanned b e f o r e  an 
o p t i m a l  one  i s  found,  t h e  o u t p u t  demand and l a b o u r  supp ly  
i n t e g r a l s  a r e  each  e v a l u a t e d  abou t  250 t i m e s .  Given t h e  
number of sets of  pa ramete r  v a l u e s  t o  be examined h e r e ,  
t h e  t i m e  invo lved  i n  such computa t ions  i s  v e r y  s u b s t a n t i a l  
and must  be weighed a g a i n s t  t h e  i n s i g h t  g a i n e d  from a d d i -  
t i o n a l  accuracy .  
14. The lower l i m i t  f o r  k  of  1 . 0  r e p r e s e n t s  a  p o i n t  a t  which 
0 
t h e  f a c t o r y  f a c e s  a  n e g l i g i b l e  demand a t  i t s  o p t i m a l  wage- 
p r i c e  combinat ion .  The upper l i m i t  i s  chosen t o  i l l u s t r a t e  
t h e  phenomenon invo lved .  
15.  The ' r o u g h n e s s '  o f  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  s u r f a c e  f o r  l a r g e  v a l u e s  of  
Pb r e f l e c t s  t h e  e r r o r  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  numer ica l  approx imat ions .  
16. I t  i s  n o t e d  i n  p a s s i n g  t h a t  s i n c e  a  and 6 1  a l s o  e n t e r  i n t o  
c  and c l  i n  Tab le  1 0 ,  t h e  combinat ion  of m i l l  p r i c e  and 
0 
wage a t  which a  - 1  - B 1  = 0  may o n l y  approximate  t h e  p o i n t  
a t  which t h e  m i l l  wage c r e s t s .  
Tl:is i s  a lways  p o s i t i v e  s i n c e ,  i n  t h e  M2 a r e a ,  h  > 0  which 
z - 
r e q u i r e s  w ( s ) h  - > B k 2 ~ ( s ) ~ / ( l  - y )  > ~ k 2 P ( s ) ~  . 
18. A s  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  ko, t h e  lower l i m i t  on 6 r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  
p o i n t  a t  which t h e  f a c t o r y ' s  o p t i m a l  o u t p u t  becomes neg- 
l i g i b l e .  The upper l i m i t  a g a i n  i s  a r b i t r a r i l y  set  t o  
i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  phenomenon i n v o l v e d .  S i n c e  6 i s  g r e a t e r  
t h a n  one  i n  some exper iments ,  i n c r e a s i n g  r e t u r n s  t o  s c a l e  
a r e  a l lowed  f o r .  
1 9 .  Note t h a t  P* and  ih /L)*  r e f e r  t o  a u t a r k y  s o l u t i o n s  o f  T a b l e  
2 .  The p r o d u c t  cP* is t h e  m a r g i n a l  v a l u e  p r o d u c t  o f  l a b o u r  
i n  a u t a r k y  and  t h i s  is u s e d  t o  d e f l a t e  t h e  m i l l  wage. 
2 0 .  A t  b below 4 0 0 . 0 ,  f a c t o r y  s o a p  demand becomes n e g l i g i b l e .  
The u p p l e r  l i m i t  i s  c h o s e n  a r b i t r a r i l y .  
